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Ursula Renz
Changing one’s own Feelings: Spinoza and
Shaftesbury on Philosophy as Therapy
Abstract: In my paper, I suggest comparing Spinoza’s and Shaftesbury’s
accounts in regard to their views on how philosophical reflection can change
our emotions. The first part discusses three aspects of their concepts of emo-
tion that support the idea of therapeutic effects provided by philosophical
reflection: 1) the naturalness of emotions, 2) cognitivism and 3) the activity
and passivity of emotions.
The second part examines how both philosophers conceive of the effects
philosophical reflection is thought to have on our emotions. Starting with some
remarks on contemporary views on how self-knowledge may be constitutive
for our mental life, I argue that neither Spinoza’s nor Shaftesbury’s account
relies on constitutivist assumptions. On the contrary, although they reject the
idea of a direct influence of rational thinking on the emotions, they both
develop convincing accounts that allow for an indirect influence of cognitive
processes on our emotional dispositions.
In the last few years, there has been an increasing interest in the idea that
philosophy is to be conceived of as some kind of therapy. To clarify this idea,
philosophers have either investigated Hellenistic ethics,1 the ideas of the later
Wittgenstein,2 or Freud’s psychoanalysis.3 But the idea that philosophy is a
kind of therapy is also widespread in early modern philosophy. In this paper,
I will focus on Spinoza and Shaftesbury who are both deeply concerned with
the emotions and who, also, ascribe philosophy a therapeutic effect.4
1 Cf. Gill 1985, Voelke 1993, and in particular Hadot 1995 who is most influential for this
reading of Hellenistic philosophy.
2 Cf. e.g. Fischer 2004.
3 Philosophical readings of Freud are defended in particular by Richard Rorty and Stanley
Cavell, cf. Rorty 1988 and Cavell 1994, for a reading of Cavell cf. Hampe 2006.
4 Therapeutical conceptions of philosophy are quite common in early modern philosophy.
One of the most ambitious thinker in this respect is surely Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirn-
haus who, in his Medicina Mentis, promotes philosophy not only as a method for acquiring
a better understanding of how things are, but also as a means of moderating one’s own pas-
sions, of conserving one’s health, as well as, finally, of educating one’s own children wisely.
Cf. Tschirnhaus 1963, 42 (first published in 1695).
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At first glance, one might be puzzled by this choice. Why, one might thus
ask, do I compare two philosophers who do not seem to have anything in
common except for their stoic heritage and their interest in human emotions?
It is true, there are more differences than commonalities between Spinoza and
Shaftesbury. They differ in their method, their style of writing, and in their
scientific interests: Spinoza, dealing with Cartesian physics and writing more
geometrico, Shaftesbury, concerned with aesthetic issues and producing texts
such as the hymn of Zeus. However, when it comes to the question of a thera-
peutic understanding of philosophy a comparison is quite instructive.
As already mentioned, they both ascribe therapeutic effects to philosophy.
More interestingly, they do not regard these as mere side effects. In Spinoza’s
Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect methodological discussions expli-
citly consider the good provided by true knowledge, as some kind of remedy.5
Shaftesbury’s therapeutic aspirations, on the other hand, are reflected in the
very form of his writings. In the Soliloquy, he explicitly suggests that his
approach is a “Practice, and Art of Surgery”, in which the doctor and the
patient are the same person.6 It is therefore to discuss their understanding of
philosophy as some kind of therapy that I juxtapose Spinoza’s and Shaftes-
bury’s approaches.
However, I am not concerned with the rhetorical use of the notion “ther-
apy” itself, but rather in the psychological and epistemological presupposi-
tions that support the idea of therapeutic effects produced by philosophical
self-reflection. How do we have to conceive of emotions in order to allow for the
idea that philosophical reflection can change them? What kind of knowledge of
oneself is required for successful therapeutic self-reflection? Do we have to
explain the natural origins of our emotions, or is the insight into their meaning
all that matters? And how, finally, is the therapeutic efficacy of philosophical
reflection explained? It is against the background of these questions that I will
compare Spinoza’s and Shaftesbury’s views on the emotions and on philo-
sophical self-knowledge.
1 The Concept of Emotion
Let me start with a rather sketchy comparison between Spinoza’s and Shaftes-
bury’s concept of emotion. I would like to emphasize three points:
5 Spinoza 1985, I, 10.
6 Shaftesbury 1981, II/2, 42–44.
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a) Naturalness. Spinoza and Shaftesbury, both describe human emotions
as natural phenomena.7 The interesting question is, however, what precisely
they have in mind. Neither of them maintains a reductionist view according to
which mental phenomena can be reduced to bodily states.8 The emphasis
which they both put on the natural origin of human emotions is rather a ques-
tion of seeing man as a part of nature. Primarily they take a stance against the
assumption of any super-natural, transcendent causation.
But there are important differences to be made. Spinoza’s naturalism
involves the rejection of any notion of creation, and I take it that also his
claim that emotions are natural entities has to be understood as precluding
any teleological consideration. Instead, they are merely regarded as effects of
certain efficient causes. As the most important efficient cause he points to the
conatus, which I would interpret as the aimless tendency of beings to persevere
in a given state.9 Shaftesbury, in contrast, conceived of nature as a harmonious
systematic order that could result only from divine design.10 In consequence,
he seeks to explain our emotions in terms of a natural teleology according to
which emotions express the relation of individuals to their environment.11 His
characterization of affections as natural thus stresses the idea of man being in
harmony with the order of nature as well as with all mankind, and what he
refers to as “unnatural affections” are emotions that are not directed to any
public or private good.
Notwithstanding these conceptual differences, the claim that emotions are
natural phenomena is in both approaches an important background for the
legitimacy of the idea that philosophy produces therapeutic effects. In particu-
lar, Spinoza and Shaftesbury both reject the notion that passions are the off-
spring of our sinful nature. This, in turn, results in several important conse-
7 This is quite obvious in the case of Spinoza who, in the preface of book three of the Eth-
ics, criticizes former approaches for treating the affects as if they were “things which are out-
side nature”, Spinoza 1985, 491. Shaftesbury’s stance in this respect is less explicitly
expressed, but see his Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit, where he considers affects in rela-
tion to the “Interest” or “Good” or “End” of every creature “to which every thing in his con-
stitution must naturally refer”, cf. Shaftesbury 1981ff., II, 2, 44. It can be assumed that Shaft-
esbury, similarly to Spinoza, conceives of the emotions as parts of nature, although there
are obvious differences in how nature is characterized.
8 The option of maintaining a physicalist reductionism also existed in the seventeenth cen-
tury, see for instance Gassendi or Henricus Regius, who both, though on different grounds,
develop materialist views on the mental.
9 See Renz 2008, 316–321 and Renz 2010a, 246–250 for a critical discussion of different
interpretations of the concept of conatus.
10 Cf. Gill 2008, 11–12, and Müller 2010.
11 Cf. also Schmitter 2010, 2.
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quences regarding the emotions as well the function of philosophy. First, they
both assume that emotions can be moderated or even altered, but not elimi-
nated by philosophical reflection. Furthermore, they both assume that reli-
gious practices can be replaced in philosophy by the activity of contemplation.
What we feel towards things depends to some degree on how we think of
things.
b) Cognitivism.12 For Spinoza as well as for Shaftesbury, emotions include
a cognitive aspect; they both consider them as states that involve representa-
tion, and, hence provide some basic information. This is not very surprising,
for it derives, at least partially, from their Stoic heritage. It is however interest-
ing to see how they further develop this idea. Let me start with the commonal-
ity. Spinoza and Shaftesbury both assume that emotions can be evaluated from
an epistemological perspective, and this presupposes not merely that emotions
involve representations, but, moreover, that they can be judged in respect to
their truth and justification, or in historical terms in respect to their adequacy.
One might object that this epistemological approach is rather problematic,
for many emotions such as love, devotion or disgust are neutral in respect to
the question of truth, whereas others are even essentially based on ignorance.
Hope, for instance, is by definition an emotion that relies on ignorance about
some future state of the world.13 I think this objection is valid insofar as it
concerns truth, but not insofar as it concerns justification. To be sure, many
emotions do not presuppose the truth of the assumptions or ideas involved,
whereas for others like hope it is even a necessary condition that they rely on
uncertain belief which cannot constitute knowledge. But we can still clearly
distinguish between more or less rational, more or less justifiable instances of
hope, even though hope is indeed an emotion that presupposes ignorance.
Hence, the denial that emotions are typically related to knowledge does not
preclude that it makes sense to evaluate our emotional life epistemologically.
But this is indeed essential if philosophy is thought to have a therapeutic
effect. If there was no systematic connection between the degree of adequacy
of our beliefs and the emotional quality of our feelings, epistemic improvement
could not result in more happiness.
However, apart from this general common ground, there are also funda-
mental differences between Spinoza’s and Shaftesbury’s cognitivism. First,
they talk about different forms of knowledge or cognition that constitute our
emotions. To use contemporary terminology, one could say that Spinoza sug-
12 See Renz 2010b, for a discussion of why cognitivism in respect to the emotions is impor-
tant for therapeutic notions of philosophy.
13 See Wild 2008 for critical objections towards any kind of affective epistemology.
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gests some kind of judgment theory. According to his definition of affect, emo-
tions necessarily involve ideas,14 and every idea contains some moment of
endorsement.15 Shaftesbury’s approach, in contrast, is rather a kind of percep-
tion theory. The experience of emotions is due to a kind of sensitive capacity,
and it is “the Forms and Images of Things” which are perceived.16 Feelings
arise from the perception of certain qualities or relations in the world, such as
proportion or order, and it is therefore no surprise that Shaftesbury portrays
the emotional mind as a spectator or auditor of the order of nature and of
human characters.17 And this is indeed an important prerequisite for his views
on the role of aesthetics in moral and emotional education.
Second, they differ on the specific contents of emotions. In Spinoza, emo-
tions provide information about the increasing or diminishing of our individual
power. For Shaftesbury, in contrast, emotional experiences register the system-
atic order or disorder in the mind. This amounts to a completely different
view on the relation between emotions and morality. In Spinoza, the nature of
emotions implies that egoism is not only the origin, but also the only rational
ground for moral claims. For Shaftesbury, in contrast, feeling creatures do not
primarily pursue their own happiness and well-being, but the order of the
system on which their happiness and well-being depends. Emotions thus
reveal a sense of nature as a whole, of mankind, and even of the whole of our
individual mind.18
c) Activity and passivity. In his definition of affect, Spinoza distinguishes
between two kinds of emotion: actions and passions, a distinction he later
associates with that between bondage and freedom.19 Humans are considered
14 Cf. 3def3, Spinoza 1985, 493.
15 This endorsement is not due to rational judgment, but consists originally in the striving
activity of the conatus which takes the form of affirming ideas in our mental activities. Cf.
also Della Rocca 2003.
16 “As in the sensible kind, the Species or Images of Bodys, Colours and Sounds, are per-
petually moving before our Eyes, and acting on our Senses […], so in the moral and intellec-
tual kind, the Forms and Images of Things are no less active and incumbent on the Mind.”
Shaftesbury 1981ff., II/2, 68. I think that Shaftesbury’s position comes close to the one main-
tained by Roberts who conceives of the emotions as concern based construals, cf. Roberts
1988, 184.
17 “The Mind, which is Spectator or Autitor of other Minds cannot be without its Eye and
Ear; so as to discern Proportion distinguish Sound, and scan each Sentiment or Thought
that comes before it […]”, Shaftesbury 1981ff., II/2, 66–68.
18 See in particular Shaftesbury’s consideration of the nature and extension of natural affec-
tion in the unpublished Philosophical Regimen, where he defines natural affection as fol-
lows: “To have natural affection is to affect according to nature or the design and will of
nature.” Cf. Rand 1992, 3.
19 Cf. 3def3 and the preface to part 4. Spinoza 1985, 493 and 543.
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slaves when they are subject to passions; whereas the free man is characterized
as someone who experiences only actions. This may partly be due to the influ-
ence of the Stoic theory of emotions that distinguishes passions categorically
from the good emotions of the wise.20
Strikingly, however, most of Spinoza’s psychology, as it is developed in
part three of the Ethics, deals with passive emotions. It seems as if our ordi-
nary emotional life consists of passions only. For Shaftesbury, in contrast,
already “the Sense of Right and Wrong” which is understood as natural affec-
tion and described as “an original one of earliest Rise in the Soul or affection-
ate part” expresses our freedom.21 Thereby, he of course did not mean to
imply that emotions are controlled by our will. On the contrary, like Spinoza,
Shaftesbury denies that emotions can be changed, unless “contrary Affection,
by frequent check and control” operates on them.22 The point is rather that
natural affection operates on the basis of our imagination, and for Shaftesbury
imagination is not, as for Spinoza, a purely mechanistic process. On the con-
trary, imagination essentially involves an element of original anticipation; it
is, in other words, the capacity of “anticipating Fancy”.23 We thus become
aware of the aesthetic and moral quality of things by imagining them in rela-
tion to the whole of a system, a relation we perceive as harmonious or dishar-
monious.24
Clearly, this difference has a considerable influence on the conception of
therapy. For Spinoza, therapeutic reflection must be guided by reason, even if
it makes use of the imagination. As regards the goal of philosophical therapy,
Spinoza puts a strong emphasis on the activity of the mind. Finally, he
assumes that freedom is only seldom attained and if so, only after a long and
difficult process. Shaftesbury’s views are quite different. First, the goal of ther-
apy is not to “rule” or “moderate” the emotions by reason, but to reestablish
the original harmony in our mind and in relation to nature. This implies that
natural affections do not have to be cured as such. Secondly, reflection is
rather an aesthetic than a rational process. In reflection we visualize our men-
tal states in a way that at the same time cultivates the order among them, with
the effect that certain distortions of our affective life disappear.
20 Cf. also Buddensiek 2008, 27 and 90f.
21 Shaftesbury 1981ff., II/2, 92.
22 Shaftesbury 1981ff., II/2, 92.
23 Cf. Shaftesbury 1981ff., II/2, 92. That anticipating involves activity rather than passivity is
also emphasized by Baum 2001, 198ff.; Kringler 2010, 130; Schrader 1984, 15f.; and Uehlein
1976, 142f.
24 Cf. also Shaftesbury 1981ff., I/2, 258ff.
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To summarize, we can say that Spinoza and Shaftesbury both conceptual-
ize human emotionality in a way that is consistent with the assumption that
emotions can, in principle, be changed by reflective processes. Yet, they
develop quite different concepts of emotion that suggest different methods of
philosophical therapy. In the next section therefore, I would like to have a
closer look at their ideas about how self-reflection and, hence, philosophy is
thought to have an effect on our emotions.
2 Philosophical self-reflection
In contemporary philosophy, the term self-knowledge is mostly used to address
the problem of our epistemic access to our own mental states. In ordinary life,
in contrast, we make a different use of the notion of self-knowledge. Whereas
in the philosophy of mind, the term ‘self-knowledge’ designates the immediate
relation we have to our occurring mental states, in ordinary life it refers to our
knowledge of ourselves as persons as well as of those mental dispositions or
personal traits which make up our character.
One could of course distinguish terminologically between these two phe-
nomena and use the term ‘self-knowledge’ exclusively to refer to our immediate
awareness of our mental states and apply, instead, the phrase ‘knowledge of
oneself as a person’ to designate the self-knowledge we speak of in ordinary
life. But while such a distinction prevents terminological confusion, it does
not solve the theoretical problems one is confronted with when discussing the
influence of self-reflection on our emotional states and attitudes. It can be
assumed, on the one hand, that in therapeutic self-reflection we aim at some-
thing more demanding than mere awareness of our actual mental states. We
wonder for instance, whether some difficulty which repeatedly affects us is
caused by some emotional disposition hitherto unknown. On the other hand,
unless emotions are assumed to be completely independent from any influence
of human thought, one has to admit that improvement in our understanding
of our personality can have an influence on how we feel, and this implies that
also the content of our awareness is altered. One can thus surmise that the
very idea of therapeutic reflection relies on the assumption of some interde-
pendency between the conception of our own personality or our knowledge of
ourselves and the quality of those occurrent mental states that constitute the
subject-matter of immediate self-awareness.
At this point, it is illuminating to have a look at a particular position in
the contemporary debate about self-knowledge. Inspired by Wittgenstein, it
has recently been suggested that we conceive of first-person-authority not pri-
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marily in terms of knowledge, but rather of constitution, therefore this position
is also called “constitutivism”.25 It is essential for constitutivism that it not
only denies that self-knowledge is based on observation, but that it instead
rejects the idea of self-knowledge being an epistemic relation at all, since this
would presuppose that our mental states are ontologically independent from
us and our way of thinking.26
There is something right and important in this view. It seems, for instance,
quite plausible that in reflecting on belief, we do not simply contemplate our
actual convictions, but rather bring them about. As Richard Moran has argued,
self-knowledge of what one actually believes is not a theoretical, but a deliber-
ative question.27 We do not wonder whether or not we actually believe p, but
deliberate on the grounds that may be considered as evidence for p or as a
reason to believe p. Furthermore, Moran has also convincingly shown that
similarly we can take a deliberative stance towards at least some of our emo-
tions. When we reflect on an instance of gratitude we usually do not wonder
about the character of our feeling towards a person, but deliberate instead
about the reasons for feeling grateful.
There are, however, other emotions that seem to be more ambiguous in
this respect, e.g. envy, jealousy, or resentment. Of course, when we reflect
about our resentment towards another person, we often also reflect on the
grounds for feeling resentful.28 But resentment, jealousy or envy, are also emo-
tions we may discover with some surprise. Furthermore, unlike in the case of
actual beliefs, we often cannot overcome these emotions with the rational
insight that there is no good ground for them. It can be assumed that this is
one of the rationales for why these emotions are often conceived of as passions.
Thus, deliberating on the grounds for our emotions may have an impact on
how we actually feel, but this is not a necessary and predictable result. We
can thus conclude that we are not obliged to embrace a full-blown constitutive
25 This label is used in particular by Bilgrami 1998, 209ff.; Gertler 2011 speaks of a ‘self-
constitution’ account.
26 See for instance Wright 1998, Bilgrami 1998 and Bar-On 2004, 122. The criticism that
self-knowledge is mistakenly thought of in terms of epistemic access is also shared by
Moran 2001, see below. It has to be emphasized however that Moran does not explicitly
embrace constitutivism, and so far as I can see, it is not clear whether he really is commit-
ted to it, as is suggested in Gertlers overview 2011.
27 Moran 2001, 59.
28 Moran 2001, 85ff., also makes the case for resentment. I am however not sure whether
Moran would oppose my view, for his interest is not to describe what we do when we reflect
on our emotions, but rather what he would conceive of as a transparency relation that holds
not just for beliefs, but for all mental attitudes. I agree with this point.
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view, even though there is good reason to assume a constitutive moment in
the relation to at least some of our mental states.
Keeping this in mind, I would now like to come back to Spinoza and Shaft-
esbury and their views on how philosophical reflection may have therapeutic
effects. In particular, I would like to inquire whether there is some conceptual
space in their accounts for the assumption of some moment of self-constitu-
tion.
Let us start with Spinoza. At first glance, one might think that the answer
is simple. It is a common place that Spinoza rejects any kind of voluntarism;
instead he embraces a strong determinism according to which all our ideas,
and hence all our mental states and dispositions, including all instances of
knowledge and rational belief, are completely determined by psychological
mechanisms. This seems to suggest that the Ethics does not allow for the
assumption of any influence of self-reflection on our actual mental states, and
that instead, the naturalistic explanation of the external causes of the emotions
is all that matters.
A closer view indicates however that Spinoza’s position is more sophisti-
cated. It is true that he does not engage in deliberative reflection about the
grounds for our emotions. On the contrary, in the preface of the Third book of
the Ethics he explicitly rejects any kind of rationalizing view of our emotional
life. Emotions are a-rational phenomena which are to be explained in terms of
their efficient causes. This does not preclude that we can distinguish between
emotions which involve adequate knowledge and others which include nearly
inadequate ideas, but it undermines the idea that emotions can be changed
by the insight into our grounds for having them. Instead of thinking about the
grounds for our feelings, we should therefore rather try to understand why we
can have emotions which lack any rational or empirical basis. More effective,
in other words, than any rationalizing about the emotions is the investigation
of the psychological mechanisms that cause those inadequate ideas underlying
our emotions.
But although Spinoza rejects the idea of rational reflection on the grounds
of our feelings, there is still some conceptual space in his account for the
claim that philosophical reflection can change our emotions. He assumes for
instance that having adequate ideas amounts to a better life, since it enhances
our potentia agendi.29 Furthermore, if we know the psychological mechanisms
behind our emotions, we can make use of this knowledge and either try to
acquire a better understanding of the particular causes of certain emotions, or
try to ignore those ideas which cause negative emotions. Finally, the Ethics
29 Cf. in particular 3p58 and 3p59. Spinoza 1985, 529.
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also develops the option of meditating on our emotions in terms of their first
cause, a perspective that necessarily leads to more peace and happiness.30
We can conclude that the therapeutic effect Spinoza ascribes to philosophi-
cal reflection is mainly to be explained in terms of the effects of knowledge in
general, as well as the strategic use we make of our causal knowledge about
psychology. And although this option to make therapeutic use of psychological
knowledge relies on the possibility of an indirect influence of philosophical
reflection on emotion, it does not require that our actual emotional states be
directly constituted by it.31
Let us now turn to Shaftesbury. At first glance, one might expect that
there is more room for self-constitution in his account than in Spinoza’s. For
Shaftesbury, the way human beings feel always concerns taking an attitude
towards certain things. This can best be seen by the fact that Shaftesbury
equates the natural affection of rational creatures with what he calls “the
Sense of Right and Wrong”, a capacity which is in turn characterized as the
“first Principle in our Constitution and Make.”32 This sense does not however
rely on abstract rational reflection, nor is it to be conceived of in sensualistic
terms; it is rather a matter of paying attention to one’s emotional responses to
certain things. Thus, in a passage bearing the marginal note “Reflex Affection”,
Shaftesbury says:
In a Creature capable of forming General Notions of Things, not only the outward Beings
which offer themselves to the Sense, are the Objects of the Affections; but the very Action
themselves, and the Affections of Pity, Kindness and Gratitude, and their Contrarys, being
brought into the Mind by Reflection, become Objects. So that, by means of this reflected
Sense, there arises another kind of Affection towards the Affection themselves, which
have been already felt, and are now become the Subject of a new Liking or Disliking.33
This passage is illuminating in many respects. Shaftesbury claims here that
human emotions, unlike those of merely sensible subjects which lack the
30 For an overview of the remedies for the affects cf. 5p20s. Spinoza 1985, 605.
31 On might wonder how this indirect influence of reflection is to be understood. I cannot
discuss this problem here, since this relies on many claims Spinoza makes in his philosophy
of mind. To put it in a nutshell, however, one can say that the therapeutic efficacy essen-
tially relies on Spinoza’s assumption of some kind of holism according to which any knowl-
edge acquired in reflection determines our future mental states. See also Renz 2010a, 270–
78 and 311ff.
32 Shaftesbury 1981ff., II/2, 92.
33 Shaftesbury 1981ff., II/2, 66. Unfortunately, these marginal notes which often introduce
key words of Shaftesbury’s terminology are missing in Lawrence E. Klein’s edition of the
Characteristics. I thank Angelica Baum who drew my attention to this passage. Her recon-
struction of Shaftesbury’s theory of emotions in 2001 is much inspired by it.
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capacity of forming general notions of things, often have a reflexive structure.34
They are not just about desired objects, but also exhibit the moral quality of
the actions and passions actually represented in the mind. In addition, it is
decisive that this reflection is itself an emotional state, for this suggests that it
is as a result of its affective quality that reflection may have an impact on our
emotions. Since, as Shaftesbury later explicitly claims, it is only the “frequent
check and control” of “contrary Affection” that may change the direction of
our natural temper.35 This indicates that even though Shaftesbury allows for
the idea of some kind of self-constitution, he does not think of it in terms of
a direct influence of deliberative reflection on the emotions. But what notion
of philosophical therapy does his view on reflex affection suggest?
To answer this question, first and foremost his approach must be consid-
ered in a broader perspective. In contrast to other philosophers referred to as
Moral Sense theorists, Shaftesbury’s primary interest is neither to develop a
system of moral virtues nor to account for the origins of moral motivation.36
Instead, his intent is to explore the possibility of education in moral issues,
including the kind of self-education that takes place in philosophical reflec-
tion. His account is thus not a theory of moral value, but of moral education;
and it is in the latter context that the concept of reflex affection is to be under-
stood. The view that human beings are able to have emotions entailing a reflex-
ive structure is a conceptual premise for the claim that contemplation of one’s
own as well as other people’s emotions may contribute to the formation of
moral attitudes. And this in turn is the reason for the assumption that art or
literature, as well as therapeutic self-reflection, can have an influence on our
virtues.
The passage cited does not however merely account for the possibility of
the formation of moral attitudes. It also implies the influence of representa-
tions on our occurring feelings. The reflection on our affections results in
another affection which is described as “a new Liking or Disking”. How is this
to be understood?
It is important, first, to note that this new liking or disliking is not brought
about by deliberative reflection. In reflex affection we do not examine the
grounds for our emotions, but consider the order or disorder in the relations
34 Cf. also Baum/Renz 2008, 364f., and in particular Baum 2001, 169ff., for a closer view of
Shaftesbury’s notion of “sensible rational Creatures”.
35 Shaftesbury 1981ff., II/2, 92.
36 Shaftesbury is often described as the founder of Moral Sense theory, and he did indeed
coin the notion ‘moral sense’. It can still be doubted whether the label ‘Moral Sense theory’
appropriately characterizes his account. See also Uehlein/Baum/Mudroch 2004, 65 for a dis-
cussion of this topic.
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between a subject and its environments, as well as between certain emotions
and the system of a whole mind. This requires that we take a distant perspec-
tive on ourselves, and not a deliberative stance. Reflex affection is thus essen-
tially a matter of quasi aesthetic contemplation, and it is therefore not surpris-
ing that it results in an aesthetic mental state, namely liking or disliking.
Another point must be emphasized. Shaftesbury obviously assumes that
reflex affection is an event that is ontologically distinct from the reflected
emotion; otherwise it could consist in a new “Liking or Disliking”. This point
is quite important for a clear understanding of Shaftesbury’s view on the
therapeutic effects of philosophical reflection, for it indicates that this effect
is not to be conceived of in terms of direct constitution. One therefore has to
be careful here not to take Shaftesbury’s terminology of constitution as an
expression of a commitment to some kind of constitutivist view of self-knowl-
edge. It is for quite different reasons that he ascribes to reflection a therapeu-
tic effect than one might expect against the background of constitutivism.
Shaftesbury assumes, on the one hand, that acquiring self-knowledge is a
process of taking a distanced stance towards oneself. In the Soliloquy, he even
interprets the Delphic inscription as demanding some kind of self-division:
Recognize Your-self: which was as much as to say, Divide your-self, or Be Two.37
In the Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit, on the other hand, the therapeutic
effect of self-reflection is explained in terms of the emotional impact of reflex
affection. Shaftesbury obviously assumes that the affective quality of reflex
affection can exert some influence on our own mental life.38
One might question whether these two explanations for the therapeutic
efficacy of self-reflection are compatible. Is it not inconsistent to conceive of
the quest for self-knowledge in terms of self-division and to claim at the same
time that moral reflection must consist of an emotional process? It would go
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this problem in detail. But I would
like to point to two aspects already that might help to defend Shaftesbury. It
has to be mentioned first that both explanations make use of the assumption
of ontological distinctness between the reflected object and self-reflection. At
least as far as this structural feature of self-reflection is concerned, there is
consistency in Shaftesbury’s views. Secondly, I would like to recall the aes-
thetic framework of Shaftesbury’s approach. If reflection is understood in
terms of aesthetic contemplation, then it seems quite natural to assume that
37 Shaftesbury 1981ff., I/1, 62.
38 Cf. in particular the passage already cited above on page XXX, Shaftesbury 1981ff., II/2,
92.
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we can look at ourselves as if we were some kind of distant object, while the
things we thereby discover may affect us in a deeply emotional way.
3 Conclusion
In this paper, I have suggested comparing Spinoza’s and Shaftesbury’s
accounts in regard to their views on how philosophical reflection can change
our emotions. It has been shown that, while their theories of the emotions
lead in different directions, they both provide a concept of emotion that allows
for emotional changes brought about by cognitive processes. In the second
part of the study, I reconstructed Spinoza’s and Shaftesbury’s quite different
answers to the question of why philosophy may have a therapeutic effect.
Starting with some remarks about contemporary views on how self-knowledge
may be constitutive for our mental life, I argued that neither Spinoza’s nor
Shaftesbury’s account relies on constitutivist presumptions. On the contrary,
although they reject the idea of a direct influence of rational thinking on the
emotions, they both develop convincing propositions that allow for an indirect
influence of cognitive processes on our emotional dispositions. Yet, there are
still many differences between their views.
When considering the history of philosophy, it thus becomes clear that
there is more than just one conceptual model to account for the presumed
therapeutic effects of self-reflection. This is not to say that there are no concep-
tual limits. Some theories of emotions as well as some conceptions of self-
knowledge are indeed inconsistent with the claim that reflection, or any other
kind of cognitive process, may have an impact on feeling. And if those views
turn out to be true, philosophy might have to renounce its therapeutic ambi-
tion. But even though these limits exists, the plausibility of the assumption
that reflection can have therapeutic effects is not dependent on one singular
theoretical framework.
There is obviously more than one way the ancient notion of philosophy as
a kind of therapy may find its way into modernity, and this is instructive and
beneficial.39
39 I want to thank Angelica Baum. I have benefited a lot from the cooperation with her on
our common article on Shaftesbury, and it is ultimately due to her that I discovered how
much inspiration Shaftesbury’s philosophy provides.
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